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Abstract—This work examines a stochastic formulation of the
generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) where agents are
subject to randomness in the environment of unknown statistical
distribution. We focus on fully-distributed online learning by
agents and employ penalized individual cost functions to deal
with coupled constraints. Three stochastic gradient strategies are
developed with constant step-sizes. We allow the agents to use
heterogeneous step-sizes and show that the penalty solution is
able to approach the Nash equilibrium in a stable manner within
O(µmax), for small step-size value µmax and sufficiently large
penalty parameters. The operation of the algorithm is illustrated
by considering the network Cournot competition problem.
Index Terms—Adaptive learning, generalized Nash equilib-
rium, penalized approximation, diffusion learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) refersto a setting where each agent in a collection of agents
seeks to minimize its own cost function subject to certain con-
straints and where both the cost function and the constraints
are generally dependent on the actions selected by the other
agents [2]–[7]. The GNEP was first formally introduced in [2]
and was called a social equilibrium problem. A special case of
GNEPs was considered in the work [8] where all agents shared
common constraints. GNEPs arise naturally in the modeling of
many applications, ranging from market liberalization of elec-
tricity [4], [9], to natural gas [10], telecommunications [11],
femto-cell power allocation [12], environmental pollution con-
trol [13], and cloud computing [14], [15]. Useful overviews
on GNEPs appear in [6], [7].
In these types of problems, the Nash equilibrium is a
desired and stable solution since at the Nash equilibrium no
agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from the solution.
However, Nash equilibrium solutions may not exist or may
not be unique. For instance, it was shown in [3], [5] that the
solution set of a GNEP can be characterized by solving a
quasi-variational inequality (QVI), and it is rare that explicit
results in QVIs can be utilized in GNEPs. Still, there is one
common and important class of GNEPs that can be partially
solved by solving a variational inequality (VI) [6], [16]. In this
work, we focus on GNEPs with shared and coupled constraints
since the theory of variational inequalities (VI) is more mature
and has more useful results than the theory of quasi-variational
inequalities (QVI).
The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University
of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1594 USA (e-mail: ckyuna@ucla.edu,
{mihaela,sayed}@ee.ucla.edu).
This work was supported in part by NSF grants ECCS-1407712 and CCF-
1524250, and by an ONR Mathematical Data Sciences grant. An early short
version of this work appeared in the conference publication [1].
In general, GNEP formulations do not admit closed-form
solutions and many algorithms have been proposed to com-
pute the solutions numerically. For example, GNEPs can be
reformulated and solved using Nikaido-Isoda (NI) functions.
Minimizing the NI can be achieved by means of gradient-
descent algorithms [17] or relaxtion-based algorithms [18].
Likewise, using the KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions,
GNEPs can be solved numerically, as demonstrated in [19].
One can also resort to penalty-based reformulations where the
original cost function is modified by including a penalty term.
The purpose of the penalty term is to assign large penalties
to deviations from the constraints. The works in [20], [21]
consider exact penalty functions and focus on updating the
penalty parameters incrementally until a certain stopping rule
is satisfied.
In all these prior works [2]–[21], the individual cost func-
tions are assumed to be deterministic. This means that, when
seeking GNEP solutions, we are able to acquire exactly the
NI functions or the gradient vectors as necessary. However,
when the agents are subject to randomness in the environ-
ment, it is customary to define the cost functions in terms
of expectations of certain loss functions. The expectation
operations are in relation to the distribution of the random
data, which is rarely known beforehand. This stochastic type
of Nash games arises in many practical applications, e.g., in
the transportation model of [22] and the signal transmission
model for wireless networks in [12]. To deal with stochasticity,
the sample average approximate (SAA) method was proposed
in [23] to approximate the expectation of the individual cost
functions. However, in this method, the equilibrium solutions
are learned in an off-line manner and the GNEP needs to be
re-solved for every given batch of samples.
In order to attain continuous learning in an online manner,
the stochastic approximation (SA) method is a more suitable
approach for differentiable cost functions, where the true gra-
dient vectors are replaced by approximations. One stochastic
implementation along these lines is considered in [24] albeit
with a vanishing step-size parameter. The use of step-sizes
that decay to zero is problematic in scenarios that require
continuous adaptation and learning.
For example, in nonstationary environments, the Nash equi-
librium will drift with time due to changes in the statistical
distribution of subsequent changes in the locations of the min-
imizers of the cost functions. When the step-size approaches
zero, as is the case with the rules considered in [26]–[29],
adaptation stops and the stochastic gradient algorithm loses
its ability to track the drift. The approach in [30] employs
a decaying step-size to track the evolving minimizer of a
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TABLE I
COMPARING WITH EXISTING WORKS FOR DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC PROBLEMS.
Optimization Target Constraints Feasibility Approach Step-Sizes Iterates Feasibility Tracking Ability
Regularized SA [24] Monotoneindividual cost
Shared and
coupled Uses projection
Heterogeneous
decaying Feasible No
Penalized Diffusion [25] Strongly-convexaggregate cost Decoupled Uses penalty functions
Uniform
constant
Asymptotically
feasible Yes
This Work Strongly-monotoneindividual costs
Shared and
coupled Uses penalty functions
Heterogeneous
constant
Asymptotically
feasible Yes
non-stationary objective. However, in that work, the optimal
sublinear regret is obtained under the condition that the varia-
tion budget VT of the time-varying loss functions is sublinear
with time. This condition implies that the variation in the loss
functions should diminish with time, which is not applicable
in the case where the minimizer of the cost function drifts
continuously. One example that does not satisfy the variation
budget condition is discussed in [25]. In comparison, it is well-
known that constant step-size adaptation in inherently capable
of tracking moderate drifts due to nonstationarity in the data
— see, e.g., the analysis in [31]–[33].
We therefore focus in this work on online and fully-
distributed learning to solve the stochastic GNEPs where
agents are only allowed to interact locally with their neighbors.
We assume that such interactions are confined to neighboring
agents over the network topology and are subject to some
coupled constraints shared by all neighbors. That is, in addition
to the stochastic setting, we build one additional topology
layer on top of conventional GNEPs with shared constraints.
One example for such stochastic GNEP scenarios linked to a
geometric topology would be the femto-cell power allocation
problem considered in [12], where distributed algorithms are
proposed and designed for this specific application. In this
work, we study general distributed learning strategies for the
solution of GNEPs by networked agents. Motivated by results
from [20], [21], [25], [34], we first resort to penalty functions
to deal with the constraints in stochastic GNEPs. The penalty
reformulation helps avoid the high computational complex-
ity of conventional NI-based approaches or the requirement
of projection steps. Traditionally, penalty methods focus on
selecting penalty parameters [20], [21]. However, in order
to cope with the stochastic nature of GNEPs, we fix the
penalty parameters at constant but sufficiently large values,
in a manner similar to [25], [34], and study the resulting
performance under stochastic environments. We also focus on
the use of constant step-sizes in the stochastic approximation
methods to enable continuous adaptation and learning. When
this is done, gradient noise seeps into the operation of the
algorithm. By gradient noise we mean the difference between
the true gradient vector and its approximation. In decaying
step-size implementations, this gradient noise component is
annihilated over time by the diminishing step-size parameter
at the expense of a deteriorating tracking performance. In
contrast, in the constant step-size implementation, the gradient
noise process is persistently present in the operation of the
algorithm. One main challenge in our analysis is to establish
that the stochastic-gradient implementation is able to keep
the influence of gradient noise under check and to deliver an
accurate estimation of the Nash equilibrium. Arriving at these
conclusions for networked agents is one key contribution of
this work. In Table I we list a summary of properties com-
paring our results to two other existing works for distributed
stochastic problems.
We remark that there exist other techniques in the stochastic
optimization literature to solve problems with the variational
inequalities. For example, the works [35]–[37] consider a
dual-averaging method, which requires the solution of an
optimization problem at each iteration; this formulation would
be useful in situations when the optimization problem can
be solved in closed form. References [38], [39] consider
stochastic mirror-based approaches, which assume the gradient
noise has bounded variance. It is worth noting that the methods
in these earlier references are not directly applicable to GNEP
with shared constraints over networks, which is one critical
contribution in this article.
In the simulations section, we will illustrate the theoretical
results and apply the proposed algorithms to the constrained
network Cournot competition problem, which is widely used
in applications such as economic trading with geographical
considerations, power management over smart grids, and re-
source allocation [4], [9], [40], [41]. We will assume there
that factories and markets are connected in a Cournot network
and suffer from some randomness in the parameters. We
will see that the numerical results will match well with our
theoretical analysis. We will also compare our algorithms
with two projection-based algorithms from [24] with decaying
step-sizes: the distributed Arrow-Hurwicz method and the
iterative Tikhonov regularization method. We will find that our
algorithms converge faster; while the mean-square-error of the
method with decaying step-sizes continuously improves at the
expense of loss in tracking and adaptation abilities.
Notation: We use lowercase letters to denote vectors and
scalars, uppercase letters for matrices, plain letters for deter-
ministic variables, and boldface letters for random variables.
Table II provides a summary of the symbols used in the article
for ease of reference.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Consider a connected network of N agents indexed by
the set N = {1, ..., N}. The neighborhood of each agent k,
denoted by Nk, includes agent k and the neighboring agents
connected to k. We denote the action of each agent k by a
vector wk ∈ RMk and associate with k an individual risk
function denoted by Jk(·). The argument of Jk(·) does not
depend solely on wk but also on the action vectors of the
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TABLE II
SUMMARY OF MAIN SYMBOLS AND NOTATION.
Symbol Meaning Equation
Jk(·), Qk(·) Individual cost and loss functions (7)
Jpk (·) Penalized individual cost function (27)
pk(·) Aggregated penalty function (28)
F (w) Block gradient vector (12)
F p(w) Penalized block gradient vector (34)
ν Strongly-monotone parameter (13)
δ Lipschitz parameter (14)
ρ Penalty parameter (27)
γk Lipschitz gradient parameter (64)
δp Parameter related to γk (65)
µmax Maximal step-size (66)
t Difference parameter for step-sizes (67)
α Gradient noise parameter (76)
ν′, ν′′ Weighted strongly-monotone parameters (68), (69)
neighboring agents. We collect the actions of all agents in the
neighborhood Nk into the block vector:
wk = col{w`; ` ∈ Nk} ∈ RMk (1)
and the actions of all agents in the network N into:
w = col{w1, . . . , wN} ∈ RM (2)
where
Mk ,
∑
`∈Nk
M`, M ,
N∑
`=1
M` (3)
For convenience, we also introduce the notation
w−k , col{w`; ` ∈ Nk \ {k}} (4)
to collect the actions of all other agents in Nk, with the
exception of agent k. Using this notation, we shall sometimes
write Jk(wk;w−k) instead of Jk(wk) in order to make the
dependence on wk explicit. We consider that the action of
each agent k should satisfy a set of local constraints:
hk,u(w
k) = 0, u = 1, . . . , Uk, (5)
gk,q(w
k) ≤ 0, q = 1, . . . , Lk (6)
The local constraint functions {hk,u(wk), gk,q(wk)} at agent
k are assumed to be differentiable and known to agent k. We
also assume that the equality constraint functions {hk,u(wk)}
are affine and the inequality functions {gk,q(wk)} are convex
in wk. We further assume that the constraints are shared by the
neighbors, i.e., if the argument of any hk,u(wk) or gk,q(wk)
at node k contains the action of some neighbor ` ∈ Nk, then
agent ` is subject to the same constraint function, i.e., it will
hold that h`,u′(w`) = hk,u(wk) or g`,q′(w`) = gk,q(wk) for
some u′ and q′. Figure 1 illustrates this setting for a network
topology with 5 agents. An example of shared constraints is
g1,1(w
1) = g2,1(w
2) = g3,1(w
3) ≤ 0, which is shared by the
connected agents 1, 2 and 3. We note that while there is no
direct link between agents 2 and 4, the actions for these agents
are coupled through the intermediate agent 3. Therefore, in
general, the actions of agents are affected explicitly by the
neighbors and also implicitly by other agents in the network.
This scenario is common in applications [6], [8], [16], [21].
Each agent k then seeks an optimal action vector that solves
the following constrained optimization problem [23], [24],
[42]:
min
wk∈RMk
Jk(w
k) , ExkQk(wk;xk)
subject to hk,u(wk) = 0, u = 1, . . . , Uk
gk,q(w
k) ≤ 0, q = 1, . . . , Lk (7)
where Jk(wk) is assumed to be differentiable and strongly-
convex in wk, Qk(·) is a scalar-valued loss function for
agent k, and the expectation is taken over the distribution
of the random data xk. For example, if we consider power
allocation in wireless heterogeneous networks, the individual
cost function Jk(wk) for each femto-base station k can repre-
sent the Shannon capacity function with channel uncertainty.
Moreover, one constraint of gk,q(wk) shared by neighboring
femto-base stations can be used to guarantee that the average
signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) at macro-user
terminals is above a certain threshold [12]. Problem (7) is
known as the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem
(GNEP). For convenience, we collect all distinct individual
constraints across all agents into a global set denoted by
S , {w;hu(w) = 0, gq(w) ≤ 0, 1 ≤ u ≤ U, 1 ≤ q ≤ L} (8)
by removing the repeated shared constraints. We assume that
S is nonempty, which means that at least one solution w exists
that satisfies the constraints in S and implies that the GNEP
in (7) is feasible for each agent. Let us denote the feasible set
of (7) by
Sk(w−k) , {wk;hk,u(wk) = 0, gk,q(wk) ≤ 0,
1 ≤ u ≤ Uk, 1 ≤ q ≤ Lk} (9)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the input (domain)
of Sk(w−k) satisfies all constraints in S that are independent
of wk. Therefore, any wk ∈ Sk(w−k) shall satisfy the
remaining constraints in S that are related to wk, i.e., for each
agent k we have
Sk(w−k) = Sk(w−k) = {wk; (wk, w−k) ∈ S} (10)
where
w−k , col{w`; ` ∈ N \ {k}} (11)
since the actions of the agents who are not neighbors of agent
k will not appear in any argument of the constraint functions
hk,u(w
k) and gk,q(wk). The conclusion in (10) shows that
the scenario considered in this work satisfies the condition of
GNEP with general shared common constraints [6].
Our objective now is to derive distributed learning strategies
by which agents can adaptively learn to solve (7) using local
observations of the actions of neighboring agents.
In preparation for our development, we collect the individual
gradient vectors of {Jk(wk)} with respect to each wTk into
F (w) , col{∇wT1J1(w
1), ...,∇wTNJN (w
N )} (12)
and assume that this block column vector satisfies the follow-
ing properties.
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Agent Neighborhood Individual Cost Constraints
1 N1 = {1, 2, 3, 5} J1(w1) = ‖w1 + w5‖2 g1,1(w1) = ‖w1‖2 + ‖w2 + w3‖2 − 2 ≤ 0
2 N2 = {1, 2, 3} J2(w2) = ‖w2‖2 g2,1(w
2) = ‖w1‖2 + ‖w2 + w3‖2 − 2 ≤ 0
g2,2(w
2) = ‖w2 − w3‖2 − 5 ≤ 0
3 N3 = {1, 2, 3, 4} J3(w3) = ‖w3‖ · ‖w4‖2 g3,1(w
3) = ‖w1‖2 + ‖w2 + w3‖2 − 2 ≤ 0
g3,2(w
3) = ‖w2 − w3‖2 − 5 ≤ 0
4 N4 = {3, 4, 5} J4(w4) = ‖w3‖+ ‖w4‖2 h4,1(w4) = 1TM4w4 + 1TM5w5 − 1 = 0
5 N5 = {1, 4, 5} J5(w5) = ‖w1‖ · ‖w5‖2 h5,1(w5) = 1TM4w4 + 1TM5w5 − 1 = 0
2
1
3
4
5
Fig. 1. Illustration of the shared constraints over a network topology
where 1 denotes the vector with all one entries.
Assumption 1: (ν-Strongly Monotone) For any two action
profiles w = w◦ and w = w•, it holds that
(w◦ − w•)T [F (w◦)− F (w•)] ≥ ν‖w◦ − w•‖2 (13)
for some positive constant ν. 
Assumption 2: (δ-Lipschitz Continuous) The block column
vector F (w) is assumed to be Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
‖F (w◦)− F (w•)‖ ≤ δ‖w◦ − w•‖ (14)
for some positive constant δ. 
If we consider two action vectors wa and wb defined as:
wa , col{w1, ..., w◦k, ..., wN} (15)
wb , col{w1, ..., w•k, ..., wN} (16)
for some k, then using (13) we get
(wa − wb)T[F (wa)− F (wb)]
= (w◦k − w•k)T
[
∇wTkJk(w
◦
k;w−k)−∇wTkJk(w
•
k;w−k)
]
≥ ν‖w◦k − w•k‖2 (17)
Therefore, Assumption 1 implies that each individual cost
function Jk(wk) is strongly convex in wk. Moreover, it holds
that δ ≥ ν since from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have
ν‖w◦ − w•‖2 ≤ (w◦ − w•)T[F (w◦)− F (w•)]
≤ ‖w◦ − w•‖ · ‖F (w◦)− F (w•)‖
≤ δ‖w◦ − w•‖2 (18)
Example 1: (Quadratic Risks) One useful example of a
loss function is the quadratic loss, which can be expressed
in the following form with the entries of xk split into xk ,
{Bk, bk, εk}:
Qk(w
k;xk) = w
kTBkw
k + bTkw
k + εk
=
∑
s∈Nk
∑
`∈Nk
wTsB
k
s`w` +
∑
`∈Nk
bTk`w` + εk
(19)
where Bk is a random symmetric matrix of size Mk ×Mk,
bk is a random vector of size 1 ×Mk, and εk is a random
scalar variable with mean εk. In (19), we partitioned Bk and
bk, respectively, into block matrices {Bks` ∈ RMs×M`} and
block vectors {bk` ∈ RM`×1} in conformity with the block
structure of wk. The random data {Bk, bk, εk} are assumed
to be independent of each other. Note that under (19), the
gradient vector of Jk(wk) with respect to wTk is the Mk × 1
vector given by
∇wTkJk(w
k) =
∑
`∈Nk
2Bkk`w` + bkk (20)
where we introduced the means Bkk` = EBkk` and bkk = Ebkk.
Collecting these individual gradient vectors we get
F (w) = Bw + b (21)
where
B ,
 2B
1
11 · · · 2B11N
...
. . .
...
2BNN1 · · · 2BNNN
 ∈ RM×M , b ,
 b11...
bNN
 ∈ RM×1
(22)
Note that Assumption 1 will hold if there exists a positive
constant ν such that for any M × 1 vector a we have
aT (B − νI) a ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ aTBa ≥ ν‖a‖2 (23)
Since B is not necessarily symmetric, we know from [43, p.
259] that (23) holds if, and only if, the symmetric part of B
satisfies:
1
2
(B +BT) ≥ νI (24)
It follows from this condition that the largest singular value
of B, denoted by σmax, should be greater than or equal to ν
since
σmax = ‖B‖ ≥
∥∥∥1
2
(B +BT)
∥∥∥ ≥ ν (25)
From (21), it is easy to verify that Assumption 2 always holds
for the quadratic loss function since
‖F (w◦)− F (w•)‖ = ‖B(w◦ − w•)‖
≤ σmax‖w◦ − w•‖ (26)

III. STOCHASTIC PENALTY-BASED LEARNING
A. Penalty Approximation for Coupled Constraints
Solving the constrained optimization problem (7) is gener-
ally demanding and may not admit a closed-form solution. In
this work, we resort to a penalty-based approach to replace the
original problem by an unconstrained optimization problem
and then show that the solution to the penalized problem
tends asymptotically with the penalty parameter to the desired
solution to (7). Even more importantly, we will show that the
penalty-based approach enables the agents to employ adaptive
learning strategies, which instantaneously approximate the
unknown random individual cost functions and endow the
agents with the ability to track variations in the location of
the Nash equilibrium due to changes that may occur in the
constraint conditions or cost measures.
The main motivation for penalty methods is to assign a
large penalty weight whenever constraints are violated and a
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smaller or zero weight when the constraints are satisfied [5],
[25], [31], [44]. More specifically, problem (7) is replaced by
the following unconstrained formulation:
min
wk∈RMk
Jk(w
k) + ρpk(w
k) , Jpk (wk) = J
p
k (wk;w−k)
(27)
where ρ ≥ 0 is a penalty parameter, pk(wk) denotes the
penalty function for agent k and is assumed to be of the
following aggregate form, with one penalty factor applied to
each constraint:
pk(w
k) =
Uk∑
u=1
θEP
(
hk,u(w
k)
)
+
Lk∑
q=1
θIP
(
gk,q(w
k)
)
(28)
where θEP(x) and θIP(x) are convex functions. The equality
penalty factor θEP(x) returns zero value if the constraint is sat-
isfied, i.e., when hk,u(wk) = 0, and introduces a large positive
penalty if the constraint is violated, i.e., when hk,u(wk) 6= 0.
For example, a continuous and differentiable choice for the
equality penalty is the quadratic function:
θEP(x) = x
2 (29)
Since hk,u(wk) is affine, a convex choice of θEP(·) ensures
the convexity of the function composition θEP
(
hk,u(w
k)
)
.
Similarly, the inequality penalty function θIP(x) returns zero
value if gk,q(wk) ≤ 0, and introduces a large positive penalty
if gk,q(wk) > 0. In the penalty method studied in [21], we
get an exact Nash equilibrium solution to (7) as long as ρ is
sufficiently large and we use the `1 penalty function [45]:
θeIP(x) = max{0, x} (30)
However, using this penalty function makes the objective
function in (27) non-differentiable, which limits the use of
gradient-based adaptation rules [46]. To avoid this difficulty,
we can employ the following half-quadratic penalty func-
tion [44], which is continuous, convex, nondecreasing, and
once-differentiable:
θIP(x) ,
{
0, x ≤ 0
x2/2, x ≥ 0 (31)
Other choices for θIP(x) are of course possible, e.g., γ-norm
[20], exponential and shifted logarithmic functions [47], [48],
linear-quadratic functions [34], and others in [25], [49]. We
note that a convex and nondecreasing choice of θIP(·) results
in a convex composite function θIP
(
gk,q(w
k)
)
since gk,q(wk)
is convex. Consequently, the penalty function pk(wk) defined
in (28) is convex in wk.
The penalized cost Jpk (w
k) is strongly-convex in wk since
Jk(w
k) is strongly-convex in wk, as seen in (17), and pk(wk)
is convex in wk, and therefore in wk. An action profile w? =
col{w?1 , ..., w?N} that minimizes simultaneously all penalized
costs {Jpk (wk)} is called a Nash equilibrium for the penalized
formulation (27), i.e., for each agent k, the Nash equilibrium
w? satisfies
Jpk (w
?
k;w
?
−k) ≤ Jpk (wk;w?−k), ∀wk ∈ RMk (32)
The following theorem ensures the existence and uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1: (Existence and Uniqueness): Under Assump-
tion 1 and for any convex choice of θEP(x) and any convex
and nondecreasing choice of θIP(x), there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium w? for problem (27), and it satisfies
F p(w?) , F (w?) + ρ∇wTp(w?) = 0 (33)
where
F p(w) , col{∇wT1J
p
1 (w
1), ...,∇wTNJ
p
N (w
N )} (34)
∇wTp(w) , col{∇wT1p1(w
1), ...,∇wTN pN (w
N )} (35)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Now, for any ρ, let us denote the unique Nash equilibrium to
the penalized optimization problem (27) by
w?(ρ) , col{w?1(ρ), ..., w?N (ρ)} (36)
where
w?k(ρ) = arg min
wk∈RMk
Jpk (wk;w
?
−k(ρ))
= arg min
wk∈RMk
Jk(wk;w
?
−k(ρ)) + ρpk(wk;w
?
−k(ρ))
(37)
For convenience, we introduce the notation:
w?k(∞) , lim
ρ→∞w
?
k(ρ) (38)
w?−k(∞) , col{w?` (∞); ` ∈ Nk \ {k}} (39)
From the results in [25, p. 3930] and [44, Theorem 9.2.2], we
know that given any w−k and as ρ goes to infinity, we have
inf
wk∈Sk(w−k)
Jk(wk;w−k) = lim
ρ→∞ infwk∈RMk
Jpk (wk;w−k) (40)
and
Jk(w
o
k;w−k) = inf
wk∈Sk(w−k)
Jk(wk;w−k) (41)
where wok ∈ Sk(w−k) is feasible for optimization problem (7)
and satisfies
wok , lim
ρ→∞ arg minwk∈RMk
Jpk (wk;w−k) (42)
Therefore, if we are given w?−k(∞), we get
Jk(w
?
k(∞);w?−k(∞)) = inf
wk∈Sk(w?−k(∞))
Jk(wk;w
?
−k(∞))
= lim
ρ→∞ infwk∈RMk
Jpk (wk;w
?
−k(∞))
= Jpk (w
?
k(∞);w?−k(∞)) (43)
It then follows that w?(∞) , col{w?1(∞), ..., w?N (∞)} is
an asymptotic Nash equilibrium of GNEP in (7) as ρ goes
to infinity. Furthermore, for each agent k the value of the
original cost Jk coincides with the value of the penalized
cost Jpk at w
?(∞). Consequently, the Nash equilibrium for
the penalized problem (27) can be made arbitrarily close to
the set of Nash equilibria (if not unique) by choosing ρ large
enough. Comparing with the variational equilibrium concept
discussed in [50], the main difference here is that instead of
solving an exact GNE directly, we introduce the differentiable
penalty function p(·) to get an asymptotic solution, which is
more practical computationally under stochastic environments
as we will see in later sections.
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B. Stochastic Learning Dynamics
The unknown statistical distribution of the data makes it
impossible to solve the penalized optimization problem (27)
analytically. As a result, a closed form solution to problem
(27) is not generally possible. If this were possible, then the
agents could learn w? given knowledge of the other agents’
actions; this solution method would lead to the best response
dynamics [51]. Since this approach is rarely applicable, agents
can instead appeal to learning strategies where they gradually
approach the desired w? through successive inference from
streaming data. For example, one well-known gradient-descent
solution to update the agents’ actions at discrete-time instants
i is to employ the following localized rule [52]–[54]:
wk,i = wk,i−1 − µk∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
i−1)
= wk,i−1 − µk(∇wTkJk(w
k
i−1) + ρ∇wTkpk(w
k
i−1)) (44)
where µk is the step-size for agent k. Alternatively, motivated
by the arguments from [25], one can implement (44) incre-
mentally by using a two-step learning strategy to improve the
individual costs and the penalty costs separately. For exam-
ple, agent k can use an Adapt-then-Penalize (ATP) diffusion
learning strategy to update first the iterate along the negative
gradient direction of the individual cost Jk(·) and then apply
the correction along the gradient of the penalty term:
(ATP)
{
ψk,i = wk,i−1 − µk∇wTkJk(w
k
i−1) (45)
wk,i = ψk,i − µkρ∇wTkpk(ψ
k
i ) (46)
where ψk,i ∈ RMk is an intermediate action of agent k and,
similar to wki , the notation ψ
k
i collects the iterates ψ`,i from
across the neighborhood of agent k. Agents can also switch
the order of these two steps and use a Penalize-then-Adapt
(PTA) diffusion learning strategy:
(PTA)
{
ψk,i = wk,i−1 − µkρ∇wTkpk(w
k
i−1) (47)
wk,i = ψk,i − µk∇wTkJk(ψ
k
i ) (48)
We note that in the gradient-based learning strategies of (44),
(45)–(46), and (47)–(48), agents are assumed to be able to
observe or acquire the intermediate actions taken by neigh-
boring agents and then synchronously update their actions1.
Furthermore, when implementing these strategies, each agent k
requires knowledge of its own gradient quantities ∇wTkJk(wk)
and ∇wTkpk(wk). When the exact statistics of the data xk are
unavailable, we need to resort to instantaneous realizations
{xk,i} of these random variables at each time i and estimate
the gradient vectors by employing constructions based on the
loss functions, i.e.,
∇̂wTkJk(w
k) , ∇wTkQk(w
k;xk,i) (49)
Using these estimates, we arrive at the following stochastic
gradient implementation:
wk,i = wk,i−1 − µk∇wTkQk(w
k
i−1;xk,i)
− µρ∇wTkpk(w
k
i−1) (50)
1We remark that asynchronous adaptation and learning is also possible,
see [55], [56] and the references therein. We focus in this work on synchronous
operation.
and the corresponding ATP and PTA diffusion versions:(
diffusion
ATP
){
ψk,i = wk,i−1 − µk∇wTkQk(w
k
i−1;xk,i) (51)
wk,i = ψk,i − µkρ∇wTkpk(ψ
k
i ) (52)
and(
diffusion
PTA
){
ψk,i = wk,i−1 − µkρ∇wTkpk(w
k
i−1) (53)
wk,i = ψk,i − µk∇wTkQk(ψ
k
i ;xk,i) (54)
Observe that we are denoting the weight iterates in boldface
since they are now random quantities due to the randomness of
∇̂wTkJk(wk) resulting from the use of realizations xk,i. Note
also that instead of diminishing step-sizes, we are considering
constant step-sizes {µk} in order to endow the algorithms with
a tracking mechanism that enables them to track variations in
the statistical distribution of the data over time. If the step-
sizes are uniform, i.e., µk = µ for all k, we will show later
in Sec. IV that the diffusion ATP and PTA strategies are
more stable than the stochastic gradient (50). Furthermore,
we will observe in the simulations of Sec. V-B that the
diffusion ATP and PTA strategies exhibit better mean-square
error performance than the stochastic gradient (50).
Example 2: (Multitask Diffusion Adaptation) The for-
mulations of multitask diffusion adaptation in [56]–[58] can
also be regarded as a special case of the GNEP formulation
for quadratic cost functions. In multitask scenarios, there
exist clusters in the network with agents in the same cluster
interested in the same objective or task (such as estimating
a common vector). Cooperation is still warranted among
agents and clusters because the multiple tasks can have some
similarities. We can reformulate the multitask problem as an
GNEP as follows:
min
wk
Jk(w
k)
subject to wk = w`, ` ∈ Nk ∩ Ck (55)
where Ck denotes the cluster that agent k belongs to. Note that
the constraints are only on the neighboring agents belonging
to cloud Ck since they have the same estimation target.
Following [56]–[58], we consider a regularized mean-square-
error risk of the form:
Jk(w
k) , E|dk(i)− uk,iwk|2 +
∑
`∈Nk\Ck
ηk`‖wk − w`‖2 (56)
where the scalar dk(i) ∈ R and the regression vector
uk,i ∈ R1×M are the observation data, and {ηk` ≥ 0} are
regularization parameters. Note that the regularization terms
include only the neighboring agents in different clusters from
Ck. Let us rewrite the constraints as {wk(m) − w`(m) = 0}
for ` ∈ Nk ∩Ck and m = 1, ...,M , and then use the quadratic
penalty function (29) to get
pk(w
k) =
∑
`∈Nk∩Ck
M∑
m=1
(wk(m)− w`(m))2 (57)
with the gradient vector
∇wTkpk(w
k) =
∑
`∈Nk∩Ck
2(wk − w`) (58)
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Using the diffusion ATP strategy in (51)–(52), we then arrive
at the multitask ATC algorithm derived in [56]–[58]:
(
multitask
ATC
)

ψk,i = wk,i−1 + µkuTk,i[dk(i)− uk,iwk,i−1]
+
∑
`∈Nk\Ck
ηk`(w`,i−1 −wk,i−1) (59)
wk,i =
∑
`∈Nk∩Ck
a`kψ`,i (60)
where
akk , 1−
∑
`∈Nk∩Ck
2µkρ, a`k , 2µkρ, for ` 6= k (61)
We note that for the case Ck = Nk, the multitask ATC al-
gorithm (59)–(60) becomes a standard diffusion strategy [33],
[49], [59]–[65]. The consensus strategies [66]–[70] can also
be derived by considering the stochastic gradient descent rule
(50) and using similar arguments. 
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We now examine the convergence and stability properties of
the distributed stochastic algorithms (51)–(52) and (53)–(54).
In particular, we examine how close their limiting point gets
to the unique equilibrium point, w?. To continue, we introduce
the following condition on the penalty function. This condition
is not restrictive since the choice of the penalty function is
under the designer’s control.
Condition 1: (Lipschitz gradients) Consider two arbitrary
block vectors w◦ and w• collecting all actions from all agents:
w◦ , col{w◦1 , ..., w◦N}, w• , col{w•1 , ..., w•N} (62)
We denote the corresponding action vectors in Nk by
wk◦ , col{w◦` ; ` ∈ Nk}, wk• , col{w•` ; ` ∈ Nk} (63)
For each individual agent k, we assume that the gradient vector
∇wTkpk(·) satisfies:∥∥∥∇wTkpk(wk◦)−∇wTkpk(wk•)∥∥∥ ≤ γk ∥∥wk◦ − wk•∥∥ (64)
where γk is a positive constant. 
Note that pk(wk) is not required to be twice-differentiable,
which is weaker than the assumption used in [25]. Then, we
have the following theorem.
Lemma 1: (Lipschitz continuity) Under Condition 1 and
Assumption 2, the penalized block gradient vector F p(w) is
(δ + ρδp)-Lipschitz continuous, i.e., for any w◦ and w• we
have
‖F p(w◦)− F p(w•)‖ ≤ (δ + ρδp)‖w◦ − w•‖ (65)
where δp , (
∑N
k=1 γ
2
k)
1/2.
Proof: See Appendix B.
In order to characterize the heterogeneous step-sizes, let us
denote the maximal and minimal step-sizes, respectively, over
the network by
µmax , max
1≤k≤N
{µk} (66)
µmin , min
1≤k≤N
{µk} , (1− t)µmax (67)
for some parameter 0 ≤ t < 1. A small value of t indicates
that the step-sizes {µk} are clustered together. To continue,
we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2: (Weighted strong monotonicity) The penalized
block gradient vector F p(w) satisfies, for any two action
profiles w◦ and w•,
(w◦ − w•)TU [F p(w◦)− F p(w•)] ≥ µmaxν′‖w◦ − w•‖2
(68)
where U , diag{µ1IM1 , ..., µNIMN } is a diagonal matrix
with step-sizes in the diagonal positions and ν′ , ν − t(δ +
ρδp). Similarly, the block gradient vector F (w) and the penalty
gradient vector ∇wTp(w) satisfy, respectively,
(w◦ − w•)TU [F (w◦)− F (w•)] ≥ µmaxν′′‖w◦ − w•‖2 (69)
(w◦ − w•)TU [∇wTp(w◦)−∇wTp(w•)]
≥ −tµmaxδp‖w◦ − w•‖2 (70)
where ν′′ , ν − tδ.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Note that for uniform step-sizes we have t = 0 and thus ν′ =
ν′′ = 0. Furthermore, ν′ and ν′′ are not necessarily positive
unless t is small enough. We further introduce the gradient
noise vector
sk,i(w
k) = ∇wTkQk(w
k;xk,i)−∇wTkJk(w
k) (71)
and define the network vectors
si(w) , col{sk,i(w1), ..., sN,i(wN )} (72)
Qi(w) , col
{∇wT1Q1(w1;x1,i), . . . ,
∇wTNQN (w
N ;xN,i)
}
(73)
where we simplified the notation sk,i(wk), si(w) and Qi(w)
by dropping {xk,i} from their arguments. Then, it holds that
si(w) = Qi(w)− F (w) (74)
Note that given the action profile w, the randomness of sk,i, si
and Qi comes from the random data {xk,i}, and therefore we
denote them in boldface. We denote by F i−1 the collection
of iterates {wk,i−1} at all agents k = 1, ..., N and up to time
i− 1.
Assumption 3: (Gradient noise) It is assumed that the first
and second-order conditional moments of the gradient noise
process satisfy:
E[si(wi−1)|F i−1] = 0 (75)
E
[‖si(wi−1)‖2|F i−1] ≤ α‖wi−1‖2 + β (76)
for some nonnegative constants α and β. 
It can be verified that conditions (75)–(76) are automatically
satisfied for important cases of interest. For example, consider
the case of quadratic losses in (19). Some straightforward
algebra shows in this case that, using stationary realizations
{Bi, bi} for the quantities {B, b} in (21), we get the approx-
imate block gradient vector as
Qi(wi−1) = Biwi−1 + bi (77)
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so that
si(wi−1) , −B˜iwi−1 − b˜i (78)
where B˜i , B−Bi and b˜i , b− bi. Note that EB˜i = 0 and
Eb˜i = 0 from the fact that B = EBi and b = Ebi. From the
independence of Bi, bi, and wi−1, Assumption 3 can be seen
to be satisfied since
E[si(wi−1)|F i−1] = −E[B˜i] ·wi−1 − Eb˜i = 0 (79)
E
[‖si(wi−1)‖2|F i−1] ≤ λmax(E[B˜Ti B˜i])‖wi−1‖2+ E‖b˜i‖2
(80)
with α = λmax(E[B˜Ti B˜i]) and β = E‖b˜i‖2.
A. Stochastic Gradient Dynamics
We consider first the stochastic-gradient implementation
(50). We can describe the evolution of the dynamics of
the algorithm in terms of the aggregate quantities wi ,
col{w1,i, ...,wN,i} by writing:
wi = wi−1 − UQi(wi−1)− ρU∇wTp(wi−1) (81)
Subtracting w? from both sides of (81), introducing the error
vector w˜i , w? −wi and using (33) we find that
w˜i = w˜i−1 + UF p(wi−1) + Usi(wi−1) (82)
The following theorem now establishes that the network error
is mean-square stable for sufficiently small step-sizes {µk}
and variation parameter t.
Theorem 2: (Mean-square-error stability) For the stochas-
tic gradient implementation (50), if the step-sizes {µk} satisfy
0 < µmax <
2ν′
(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α
, t <
ν
δ + ρδp
(83)
then it holds that
lim
i→∞
supE‖w˜i‖2 = O(µmax) (84)
Proof: See Appendix D.
B. Diffusion ATP and PTA Strategies
Let us consider next the deterministic ATP and PTA strate-
gies (45)–(46) and (47)–(48), respectively, without gradient
noise. Later, we re-incorporate the gradient noise and adjust
the conclusions. Thus, note that in the noiseless case we can
aggregate the recursions across all agents into the following
unified description:
φi = wi−1 − c1ρU∇wTp(wi−1) (85)
ψi = φi − UF (φi) (86)
wi = ψi − c2ρU∇wTp(ψi) (87)
for some constants (c1, c2). By setting (c1, c2) = (0, 1) we re-
cover the ATP recursions (45)–(46) while for (c1, c2) = (1, 0)
we obtain the PTA recursions from (47)–(48). We thus note
that the constants (c1, c2) satisfy the properties:
c21 = c1, c
2
2 = c2, c1 · c2 = 0, c1 + c2 = 1 (88)
The following result establishes that recursions (85)–(87)
converge to a unique fixed point.
Theorem 3: (Unique fixed point) The mapping from wi−1
to wi in (85)–(87) converges to a unique fixed point, denoted
by ψ∞, for small step-sizes and for sufficiently large penalty
parameters that satisfy:
0 < µmax < µo, t <
ν
δ + ρδp
, ρ >
δ
δp
(89)
where
µo , min
 2ν′δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp , ν
′ +
t(ρ2δ2p−δ2)
ρδp
δ2
 (90)
Proof: See Appendix E.
We note that if the step-sizes are uniform, i.e., µk = µ and
t = 0, the step-size condition in (89) simplifies to
0 < µ <
2ν
δ2 + ρ2δ2p
(91)
since
ρ >
δ
δp
⇐⇒ ρ2δ2p > δ2 ⇐⇒
ν
δ2
>
2ν
δ2 + ρ2δ2p
(92)
From Theorem 3 we know that there exists a unique fixed
point for recursion (85)–(87), which means that we can write
φ∞ = w∞ − c1ρU∇wTp(w∞) (93)
ψ∞ = φ∞ − UF (φ∞) (94)
w∞ = ψ∞ − c2ρU∇wTp(ψ∞) (95)
where we are denoting the network fixed-point vectors by
w∞, ψ∞ and φ∞. Similarly, we can express the diffusion
(stochastic) versions of the ATP and PTA strategies in (51)–
(52) and (53)–(54) in the form:
φi = wi−1 − c1ρU∇wTp(wi−1) (96)
ψi = φi − UQi(φi) (97)
wi = ψi − c2ρU∇wTp(ψi) (98)
Let w˜∞i , w∞ − wi denote the fixed-point error resulting
from (96)–(98).The following theorem shows that the variance
of this error is bounded.
Theorem 4: (Bounded MSE) For the stochastic recursion
(96)–(98), if the step-sizes {µk} and the penalty parameter ρ
satisfy
0 < µmax < µ
′
o, t <
ν
δ + ρδp
, ρ >
√
δ2 + 2α
δp
(99)
where
µ′o , min
{
2ν′
δ2 + 2α+ ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp
,
ν′ +
t(ρ2δ2p−(δ2+2α))
ρδp
δ2 + 2α
}
(100)
then it holds that for sufficiently small step-sizes
lim
i→∞
supE‖w˜∞i ‖2 = O(µmax) (101)
Proof: See Appendix F.
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It is easy to verify that if the step-sizes are uniform, the step-
size condition in (99) becomes
0 < µ <
2ν
δ2 + 2α+ ρ2δ2p
(102)
We note from α ≥ 0 that µ′o ≤ µo, which means that condition
(99) for the stochastic recursion implies condition (89) for the
deterministic recursion. Therefore, any µmax satisfying (99)
ensures the existence of the fixed point w∞. However, the
fixed point w∞ is generally different from the desired Nash
equilibrium w?. In the following theorem, we examine the bias
w˜ , w?−w∞. We show that for small µmax, the norm of the
bias is asymptotically upper bounded by O(µmax).
Theorem 5: (Small bias) For sufficiently small step-sizes
{µk} satisfying the following conditions:
0 < µmax < µo, t <
ν
δ + ρδp
, ρ >
δ
δp
(103)
it holds that
lim
µmax→0
sup
‖w? − w∞‖
µmax
≤ cρ (104)
where c is a constant independent of µmax. Therefore, for
sufficiently small µmax we can write
lim
i→∞
supE‖w? −wi‖2
≤ 2 lim
i→∞
supE‖w∞ −wi‖2 + 2‖w? − w∞‖2
= O(µmax) +O(µ
2
maxρ
2) (105)
Proof: See Appendix G.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the relation between wi, w?, and
w∞ in steady-state for sufficiently small step-sizes. We note
that wi, w?, and w∞ asymptotically approach to the Nash
equilibrium set of the original GNEP (7) as ρ → ∞ and
µmax → 0. We note that condition (99) implies conditions
(89) and (103). That is, as long as the step-sizes {µk} and
the penalty parameter ρ satisfy (99), the diffusion ATP and
PTA learning strategies have fixed points, bounded MSE,
and small bias. Furthermore, comparing (102) with (83) we
observe that by using uniform step-sizes, the diffusion ATP
and PTA learning strategies are more stable than the stochastic
gradient dynamic strategy (50) since they are allowed to use
a larger step-size, which would assist with faster convergence
performance. We will observe this in the simulations later. For
the special case in Example 2, this conclusion conforms with
the results in [71] that the diffusion strategies are more stable
than the consensus strategy.
V. CASE STUDY AND SIMULATIONS
A. Stochastic Network Cournot Competition
In this section, we consider the stochastic network Cournot
competition problem [4], [9], [40], [72], [73] with shared
constraints. We assume that the environment is stochastically
dynamic in the following manner. Suppose that we have a
network with N factories, regarded as the agents discussed
in this work, and L markets connected to the factories.
Each factory k needs to determine a continuous-valued and
nonnegative quantity of products to be produced and delivered
Fig. 2. Illustration of the relations between wi, w?, and w∞ in
steady-state for sufficiently small step-sizes. The notation O(µmax)
and O(µ2maxρ2) in the drawing represent the squared distances
E‖w∞ −wi‖2 and ‖w? − w∞‖, respectively.
to each connected market, which is defined as the action of
factory k denoted by wk = [wk(1), ..., wk(Mk)]T where we
assumed Mk markets are connected to factory k. For each
factory k, there exists a random quadratic production cost
function to generate
∑Mk
n=1 wk(n) amount of products, i.e.,
the production cost function for each factory is given by
Ck(wk) = (xk + vx,k)
(
Mk∑
m=1
wk(m)
)2
(106)
for some parameter xk > 0 and random disturbance vx,k with
zero mean. Furthermore, the price of products sold in each
market ` is assumed to follow a linear function:
P`(r(`)) = q` − (y` + vy,`)r(`) (107)
where q` > 0 and y` > 0 are the pricing parameters, the
random disturbance vy,` is zero-mean, and r(`) is the total
amount of products delivered to market ` by all connected
factories, i.e.,
r(`) =
N∑
k=1,wk(u)@`
wk(u) (108)
where we write wk(u) @ ` to represent that wk(u) is the
quantity that factory k delivers to market `. Note that in
order to be consistent with the notation in (7), the index u in
wk(u) can be different from the index ` denoted for markets.
Consequently, each factory k has an individual cost function
as follows:
Jk(w
k) = E
Ck(wk)− L∑
`=1,u@`
wk(u) · P`(r(`))

= xk
( Mk∑
m=1
wk(m)
)2
−
L∑
`=1,wk(u)@`
wk(u)(q` − y` · r(`))
(109)
Note that the loss functions in the individual cost functions
can be rewritten in the quadratic form (19). Now, let us
show that {Jk(wk)} in the network Cournot competition are
strongly monotone. For each u @ ` we have the components
in ∇wTkJk(wk) as
∂Jk(w
k)
∂wk(u)
= 2xk
Mk∑
m=1
wk(m)− q` + y` [wk(u) + r(`)] (110)
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Fig. 3. An example to illustrate the network Cournot competition and
the equilivant network topology.
If we collect these components into the long block vector
F (w), we get the form in (21) where the (m,n)−th entry
in each block of matrix B is given by
Bkkk(m,n) =
{
xk + y`, if m = n s.t. wk(m) @ `
xk, if m 6= n
(111)
Bkkq(m,n) =
{
y`, if wk(m) @ ` and wq(n) @ `
0, otherwise
, k 6= q
(112)
It is easy to check that matrix B can be expressed as
B = XXT + Y1Y
T
1 + Y2Y
T
2 (113)
where X is an M ×M diagonal matrix with diagonal entries
{√y`ku} for wk(u) @ `ku, Y1 is a M × N block diagonal
matrix with N × N blocks in which the (k, k)−th diagonal
block is Y1,kk =
[√
2xk, ...,
√
2xk
]T
of size Mk × 1, and Y2
is a M × L block matrix with N × L blocks in which the
(k, `)−th block is a vector of size Mk × 1 and defined as
Y2,k`(m) =
{√
y`, if wk(m) @ `
0, otherwise
(114)
Therefore, we find that B has the following property for any
M × 1 vector a:
aTBa = aTXXTa+ ‖Y T1 a‖2 + ‖Y T2 a‖2 ≥ xmin · ‖a‖2
(115)
where xmin , min1≤`≤L x`. Consequently, the network
Cournot competition with individual cost functions in (109)
satisfies the strongly monotone property (13).
Example 3: (Cournot network with 3 agents) An illus-
trative example with N = 3 factories and L = 3 markets is
provided in Fig. 3. Following the notations for the quantities
at each link, we have the individual cost functions for the
factories as
J1(w
1) = x1 [w1(1) + w1(2)]
2 − w1(1) · (q1 − y1 · w1(1))
− w1(2) · (q2 − y2 · [w1(2) + w3(2)])
J2(w
2) = x2[w2(1)]
2 − w2(1) · (q2 − y2 · [w1(2) + w3(2)])
J3(w
3) = x3 [w3(1) + w3(2)]
2
− w3(1) · (q2 − y2 · [w1(2) + w3(2)])
− w3(2) · (q3 − y3 · [w2(1) + w3(1)])
Therefore, we get
∂J1(w
1)
∂w1(1)
= 2x1 [w1(1) + w1(2)]− q1 + 2y1w1(1)
∂J1(w
1)
∂w1(2)
= 2x1 [w1(1) + w1(2)]− q3 + 2y3w1(2) + y3w3(2)
∂J2(w
2)
∂w2(1)
= 2x2w2(1)− q2 + 2y2w2(1) + y2w3(1)
∂J3(w
3)
∂w3(1)
= 2x3 [w3(1) + w3(2)]− q2 + 2y2w3(1) + y2w2(1)
∂J3(w
3)
∂w3(2)
= 2x3 [w3(1) + w3(2)]− q3 + 2y3w3(2) + y3w1(2)
It can be then verified that matrix B is given by
B =

2x1 + 2y1 2x1 0 0 0
2x1 2x1 + 2y3 0 0 y3
0 0 2x2 + 2y2 y2 0
0 0 y2 2x3 + 2y2 2x3
0 y3 0 2x3 2x3 + 2y3

= XXT + Y1Y
T
1 + Y2Y
T
2 (116)
where
X = diag{√y1,√y3,√y2,√y2,√y3} (117)
Y1 =
√2x1 √2x1 0 0 00 0 √2x2 0 0
0 0 0
√
2x3
√
2x3
T (118)
Y2 =
√y1 0 0 0 00 0 √y2 √y2 0
0
√
y3 0 0
√
y3
T (119)

B. Numerical Results
In the simulations, we consider a network with N = 20
factories and L = 7 markets which are connected as shown
in Fig. 4. For each individual cost function Jk(wk), we set
xk = 4, q` = 12, and y` = 4 for all k and ` in (109). For
the stochastic setting, the realizations of random noises vx,k
and vy,` for all k and ` are generated at each time instant i,
and are assumed to be temporally and spatially independent.
We further assume that both vx,k and vy,` are uniformly
distributed between [−4, 4]. The step-sizes are assumed to be
uniform, i.e., µk = µ for all k.
The action wk of each factory k needs to be determined
under the following constraints. The quantity of products
delivered to each market has to be nonnegative and each
market ` has an upper limit capacity h` of products, i.e., for
m = 1, ...,Mk and ` = 1, ..., L,
wk(m) ≥ 0, r(`) =
N∑
k=1,wk(u)@`
wk(u) ≤ h` (120)
where h` is set to be 1 in the experiments. Furthermore, we ap-
ply the quadratic penalty function in (31) to each constraint in
the algorithms. We remark that the proposed penalty methods
give only asymptotically feasible solutions, which could be
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improved by imposing harsher penalty or considering stricter
constraints than (120). However, we rely on (120) in the
simulations to examine the numerical performance regardless
of solution feasibility.
We first set the penalty parameter ρ to 200 and vary the
step-size µ for the stochastic gradient dynamic (50), ATP
strategy (51)-(52), and PTA strategy (53)-(54). In Fig. 5, we
study the mean-square-deviation (MSD) performance, defined
as E‖w∞ − wi‖2, for each algorithm toward its fixed point.
Note that for the stochastic gradient case we have w∞ = w?.
We can see that with a smaller step-size µ, the three algorithms
exhibit smaller steady-state MSD values while converging
slower, and their differences vanish with smaller µ as well.
It is worthwhile to note though that the diffusion ATP and
PTA strategies generally outperform the stochastic gradient
dynamic. Furthermore, the ATP and PTA strategies allow
larger ranges of step-sizes, as we can see that for µ = 0.0065
these two strategies converge while the stochastic gradient
dynamic does not. In Fig. 6, we observe that for sufficiently
small step-sizes, the steady-state MSD values of diffusion ATP
and PTA decrease linearly with respect to µ, as we expect
from (101). The bias between the fixed points w∞ and the
Nash equilibrium w? is shown in Fig. 7. We can see that the
bias ‖w? − w∞‖ is linear with respect to the step-size µ and
the slope becomes steep when ρ increases, which verifies the
result in (104). Comparing diffusion ATP and PTA strategies
using sufficiently small step-sizes, we find that diffusion ATP
exhibits smaller steady-state MSD values than diffusion PTA;
on the other hand, diffusion PTA shows smaller bias values
than diffusion ATP. This result would depend on the structure
of the individual costs and the shared constraints, and the
selection of the penalty functions θIP and θEP. However, as
the step-size decreases, the difference between diffusion ATP
and PTA strategies becomes small in terms of the steady-state
MSD and bias.
For comparisons, we simulate two related projection-based
stochastic algorithms discussed in [24], i.e., the distributed
Arrow-Hurwicz method and the iterative Tikhonov regulariza-
tion. Both algorithms use a constant and uniform step-size
µ = 0.003 in our setting. The distributed Arrow-Hurwicz
method consists of the following two steps:
wk,i = ΠR+
[
wk,i−1 − µ
(
∇̂wTkJk(wk,i−1)∑L
`=1 λ`,i−1(ri(`)− h`)
)]
λ`,i = ΠR+ [λ`,i−1 + µ(ri(`)− h`)]
(121)
where ri(`) denotes the random realization for r(`) at time
i. On the other hand, the iterative Tikhonov regularization
follows these two steps:
wk,i = ΠR+
[
wk,i−1 − µ
(
iwk,i−1 + ∇̂wTkJk(wk,i−1)∑L
`=1 λ`,i−1(ri(`)− h`)
)]
λ`,i = ΠR+ [λ`,i−1 + µ(ri(`)− h`)− µλ`,i−1]
(122)
where  = 0.5012 is the regularization parameter. We note
that these two algorithms rely on the additional use of L La-
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grange multiplier(s) to deal with the shared constraints, which
require some additional “bridge nodes” for implementation.
Furthermore, the projection step incurs additional computation
complexity. These two problems do not appear in our penalty-
based algorithms proposed in this work. In Fig. 8, we simulate
the MSD learning curves for these algorithms. In order to
make a fair comparison, we set the step-size µ = 0.003 for
the penalty-based strategies. The penalty parameter ρ is set to
200. We observe that the stochastic gradient dynamic, ATP,
and PTA strategies converge much faster than the distributed
Arrow-Hurwicz method and the iterative Tikhonov regular-
ization. Furthermore, the distributed Arrow-Hurwicz and the
iterative Tikhonov regularization methods have larger steady-
state MSD values than the three penalty-based algorithms.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work focuses on GNEPs with shared constraints over
network topologies in stochastic environments. We develop
three fully-distributed online learning strategies which asymp-
totically approach the set of generalized Nash equilibrium
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for small constant step-sizes and sufficiently large penalty
parameters. An interesting future work would be to explore
how the converging point of our algorithms in the set of
GNE(s) relate to the variational equilibrium obtained by
KKT conditions with identical Lagrange multipliers [74], [75].
Another possibility for future work is to explore the use of
sub-gradient methods would be useful for sub-differentiable
penalty functions and/or individual cost functions [35], [70],
[76]. Asynchronous adaptation learning [55], [56] is also a
useful extension so that agents do not need to execute the
update of actions simultaneously.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We introduce the aggregate penalty function
p(w) ,
U∑
u=1
θEP(hu(w)) +
L∑
q=1
θIP(gq(w)) (123)
and note that
∇wTk p(w) =
U∑
u=1
∇hu(w)θEP(hu(w)) · ∇wTkhu(w)
+
L∑
q=1
∇gq(w)θIP(gq(w)) · ∇wTkgq(w) (124)
and
∇wTk pk(w
k) =
Uk∑
u=1
∇hk,u(wk)θEP(hk,u(wk)) · ∇wTkhk,u(w
k)
+
Lk∑
q=1
∇gk,q(wk)θIP(gk,q(wk)) · ∇wTkgk,q(w
k)
(125)
Recall that, as defined in (8), the global constraint functions
{hu(w)} and {gq(w)} are distinctly collected and include all
{hk,u(wk)} and {gk,q(wk)} in the network. Therefore, if a
global constraint function hu(w) or gq(w) relates to some
action wk, agent k is subject to the same constraint function,
say, hk,u′(wk) = hu(w) or gk,q′(wk) = gq(w). That is, we can
find one-to-one mapping from every nonzero ∇wTkhu(w) or∇wTkgq(w) in (124) to some ∇wTkhk,u′(wk) or ∇wTkgk,q′(wk)
in (125), which means that we have
∇wTkpk(w
k) = ∇wTk p(w) (126)
so that
∇wT p(w) = col{∇wT1p1(w
1), ...,∇wTN pN (w
N )} (127)
From (21) and (33) we can write
F p(w) , col{∇wT1J
p
1 (w
1), ...,∇wTNJ
p
N (w
N )}
= F (w) + ρ∇wTp(w) (128)
Since the sum of convex functions is also convex, we know
that p(w) is convex and, therefore, for any wa and wb:
(wa − wb)T[∇wTp(wa)−∇wTp(wb)] ≥ 0 (129)
Using (13) we get
(wa − wb)T[F p(wa)− F p(wb)]
= (wa − wb)T[F (wa)− F (wb) +∇wTp(wa)−∇wTp(wb)]
≥ ν‖wa − wb‖2 (130)
It follows that the penalized mapping F p : RM → RM is
strongly monotone. In order to examine the existence of a Nash
equilibrium, we need to show that the strong monotonicity of
F p(w) satisfies the coerciveness property [77, p. 14], i.e., for
some wref ∈ RM ,
lim
‖w‖→∞
[
F p(w)− F p(wref)]T (w − wref)
‖w − wref‖ =∞ (131)
Using (130) and setting wa = w and wb = wref we get
lim
‖w‖→∞
[
F p(w)− F p(wref)]T (w − wref)
‖w − wref‖
≥ lim
‖w‖→∞
ν‖w − wref‖
≥ lim
‖w‖→∞
ν‖w‖ − ν‖wref‖
=∞ (132)
which shows that F p(w) satisfies the coerciveness property in
(131) with wref. We then conclude the existence of solutions
to problem (27).
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The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is also guaranteed
by the strong monotonicity following [78, Theorem 2.3.3].
Since Jpk (wk;w−k) is convex and differentiable in wk, from
the optimality criterion [79] we know that the Nash equilib-
rium satisfies
(w′k − w?k)T∇wkJpk (w?k;w?−k) ≥ 0 (133)
for all feasible w′k. Summing up these conditions over all
agents we get
N∑
k=1
(w′k − w?k)T∇wkJpk (w?k;w?−k) = (w′ − w?)TF p(w?) ≥ 0
(134)
Let us first assume the existence of two distinct solutions,
w? 6= w† ∈ RM . Then, for any w′ ∈ RM they will satisfy
(w′ − w?)TF p(w?) ≥ 0, (w′ − w†)TF p(w†) ≥ 0 (135)
Setting w′ = w† in the first inequality and w′ = w? in the
second inequality we get
(w† − w?)TF p(w?) ≥ 0, (w? − w†)TF p(w†) ≥ 0 (136)
By adding these two inequalities, we arrive at
(w† − w?)T[F p(w†)− F p(w?)] ≤ 0 (137)
which contradicts the strong monotonicity of F p(w). We thus
conclude that the Nash equilibrium is unique. Now, from the
optimality criterion [79] and given w?−k, we note that w
?
k is
optimal if, and only if,
∇wkJpk (w?k;w?−k) = 0 (138)
Collecting these conditions for all agents we obtain
F p(w?) = F (w?) + ρ∇wTp(w?) = 0 (139)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Using Condition 1, we have
‖∇wTp(w◦)−∇wTp(w•)‖2
=
N∑
k=1
∥∥∥∇wTkpk(wk◦)−∇wTkpk(wk•)∥∥∥2
≤
N∑
k=1
γ2k‖wk◦ − wk•‖2
≤ δ2p‖w◦ − w•‖2 (140)
where we used the fact that ‖wk◦−wk•‖2 ≤ ‖w◦−w•‖2. Then,
it follows that
‖F p(w◦)− F p(w•)‖
≤ ‖F (w◦)− F (w•)‖+ ρ‖∇wTp(w◦)−∇wTp(w•)‖
≤ (δ + ρδp)‖w◦ − w•‖ (141)
as claimed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first note that
(w◦ − w•)TU [F p(w◦)− F p(w•)]
=
N∑
k=1
µk(w
◦
k − w•k)T
[
∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
◦)−∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
•)
]
= µmax
N∑
k=1
(w◦k − w•k)T
[
∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
◦)−∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
•)
]
−
N∑
k=1
(µmax − µk)(w◦k − w•k)T
[
∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
◦)−∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
•)
]
(142)
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we get
N∑
k=1
(µmax − µk)(w◦k − w•k)T
[
∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
◦)−∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
•)
]
≤ (µmax − µmin)
N∑
k=1
(w◦k − w•k)T
[
∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
◦)−∇wTkJ
p
k (w
k
•)
]
≤ tµmax
N∑
k=1
‖w◦k − w•k‖ ·
∥∥∥∇wTkJpk (wk◦)−∇wTkJpk (wk•)∥∥∥
(a)
≤ tµmax
(
N∑
k=1
‖w◦k − w•k‖2
) 1
2
×
(
N∑
k=1
∥∥∥∇wTkJpk (wk◦)−∇wTkJpk (wk•)∥∥∥2
) 1
2
= tµmax‖w◦ − w•‖ · ‖F p(w◦)− F p(w•)‖ (143)
where (a) is obtained from Ho¨lder’s inequality [80]. By (143)
we have
(w◦−w•)TU [F p(w◦)− F p(w•)]
≥ µmax(w◦ − w•)T[F p(w◦)− F p(w•)]
− tµmax‖w◦ − w•‖ · ‖F p(w◦)− F p(w•)‖
≥ µmaxν‖w◦ − w•‖2 − tµmax(δ + ρδp)‖w◦ − w•‖2
= µmax[ν − t(δ + ρδp)] · ‖w◦ − w•‖2 (144)
where we used the strong monotonicity property (130) and the
Lipschitz continuous property (141). Similarly, we can express
(w◦−w•)TU [F (w◦)− F (w•)]
≥ µmax(w◦ − w•)T[F (w◦)− F (w•)]
− tµmax‖w◦ − w•‖ · ‖F (w◦)− F (w•)‖
≥ µmax(ν − tδ)‖w◦ − w•‖2 (145)
and
(w◦−w•)TU [∇wTp(w◦)−∇wTp(w•)]
≥ µmax(w◦ − w•)T[∇wTp(w◦)−∇wTp(w•)]
− tµmax‖w◦ − w•‖ · ‖∇wTp(w◦)−∇wTp(w•)‖
≥ −tµmaxδp‖w◦ − w•‖2 (146)
where we used Assumptions 1 and 2, the convexity property
(129), and the Lipschitz continuous property (140).
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first note that assumption (76) can be rewritten as
E
[‖si(wi−1)‖2|F i−1] ≤ α‖wi−1 − w? + w?‖2 + β
≤ 2α‖w˜i−1‖2 + β′ (147)
where we used ‖a + b‖2 ≤ 2‖a‖2 + 2‖b‖2 and introduced
β′ , β + 2α‖w?‖2. Then, using properties (75), (76), (65),
(68), and the fact that F p(w?) = 0, we can express the mean-
square error E‖w˜i‖2 from (82) as
E‖w˜i‖2
= E‖w˜i−1‖2 − 2 E
[
w˜Ti−1U(F
p(w?)− F p(wi−1))
]
+ E‖F p(w?)− F p(wi−1)‖2U2 + E‖si(wi−1)‖2U2
≤ E‖w˜i−1‖2 − 2 E
[
w˜Ti−1U(F
p(w?)− F p(wi−1))
]
+ µ2maxE‖F p(w?)− F p(wi−1)‖2 + µ2maxE‖si(wi−1)‖2
≤ (1− 2µmaxν′ + µ2max[(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α])E‖w˜i−1‖2 + µ2maxβ
(148)
Note that from δ ≥ ν in (18) we have
1− 2µmaxν′ + µ2max[(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α]
= 1− 2µmax[ν − t(δ + ρδp)] + µ2max[(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α]
= (1− µmaxν)2 + µ2max((δ + ρδp)2 + 2α− ν2)
+ 2µmaxt(δ + ρδp) ≥ 0 (149)
Therefore, the mean-square error is stable asymptotically, as
i→∞, when the step-size µmax satisfies
|1− 2µmaxν′ + µ2max[(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α]| < 1
⇐⇒ − 1 < 1− 2µmaxν′ + µ2max[(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α] < 1
⇐⇒ 0 < µmax < 2ν
′
(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α
(150)
when ν′ is positive, i.e.,
ν′ = ν − t(δ + ρδp) > 0 ⇐⇒ t < ν
δ + ρδp
(151)
This leads to the conditions in (83), and the resulting mean-
squared error is upper bounded by
lim
i→∞
supE‖w˜i‖2 ≤ µmaxβ
2ν′ − µmax[(δ + ρδp)2 + 2α] = O(µmax)
(152)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let us consider two unequal vectors w◦i−1 and w
•
i−1 with
corresponding vectors {φ◦i , ψ◦i , w◦i } and {φ•i , ψ•i , w•i } in im-
plementation (85)–(87). The squared Euclidean distance be-
tween φ◦i and φ
•
i is given by
‖φ◦i − φ•i ‖2
= ‖(w◦i−1 − w•i−1)− c1ρU [∇wTp(w◦i−1)−∇wTp(w•i−1)]‖2
≤ ‖w◦i−1 − w•i−1‖2 + c21µ2maxρ2‖∇wTp(w◦i−1)−∇wTp(w•i−1)‖2
− 2c1ρ(w◦i−1 − w•i−1)TU [∇wTp(w◦i−1)−∇wTp(w•i−1)]
≤ (1 + 2c1tµmaxρδp + c1µ2maxρ2δ2p)‖w◦i−1 − w•i−1‖2 (153)
where we used the properties (140), (70), and c21 = c1 from
(88). Using similar arguments we have
‖w◦i − w•i ‖2 ≤ (1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ2maxρ2δ2p)‖ψ◦i − ψ•i ‖2
(154)
For ψ◦i and ψ
•
i , we can write
‖ψ◦i − ψ•i ‖2 = ‖(φ◦i − φ•i )− U(F (φ◦i )− F (φ•i ))‖2
≤ ‖φ◦i − φ•i ‖2 − 2(φ◦i − φ•i )TU(F (φ◦i )− F (φ•i ))
+ µ2max‖F (φ◦i )− F (φ•i )‖2
≤ (1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2maxδ2)‖φ◦i − φ•i ‖2 (155)
where we used (69) and Assumption 2. Combining (153),
(154), and (155) we get
‖w◦i − w•i ‖2 ≤ (1 + 2c1tµmaxρδp + c1µ2maxρ2δ2p)
× (1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ2maxρ2δ2p)
× (1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2maxδ2)‖w◦i−1 − w•i−1‖2
= (1 + 2tµmaxρδp + µ
2
maxρ
2δ2p)
× (1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2maxδ2)
× ‖w◦i−1 − w•i−1‖2 (156)
The mapping wi−1 7→ wi is a contraction if
|(1 + 2tµmaxρδp + µ2maxρ2δ2p)(1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2maxδ2)| < 1
⇐⇒ −1 < (1 + 2tµmaxρδp + µ2maxρ2δ2p)
× (1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2maxδ2) < 1 (157)
We note that
1−2µmaxν′′ + µ2maxδ2
= (1− µmaxν)2 + µ2max(δ2 − ν2) + 2µmaxtδ ≥ 0 (158)
Therefore, the inequality on the left-hand side of (157) always
holds. Expanding the product of the two terms and using ν′ =
ν′′ − tρδp we get for the inequality on the right-hand side of
(157) that we must have
1− a1 < 1⇐⇒ a1 > 0 (159)
where
a1 , 2µmaxν′ − µ2max(δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp)
+ µ3max(ρ
2δ2pν
′′ − tρδpδ2)− µ4maxρ2δ2pδ2 (160)
Therefore, if we can guarantee
ν′ > 0 (161)
δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp > 0 (162)
µ3max(ρ
2δ2pν
′′ − tρδpδ2) > µ4maxρ2δ2pδ2 (163)
then the condition a1 > 0 is satisfied if
2µmaxν
′ − µ2max(δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp) > 0 (164)
which means
µmax < 2ν
′/(δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp) (165)
Let us examine conditions (161)–(163). From (151) we know
that the condition of a positive ν′ holds if
t < ν/(δ + ρδp) (166)
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For the second condition (162), we now show that if ρ is
sufficiently large such that
ρ > δ/δp ⇐⇒ ρδp > δ (167)
then
f(t) , δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp
= 4t2δρδp − 4tνρδp + δ2 + ρ2δ2p > δ2 > 0 (168)
where we used ν′′ = ν − tδ. Note that f(t) is a quadratic
function of t and has a minimum at to = ν/(2δ). Therefore,
it is required that
f(to) = δ2 + ρ2δ2p − ρδp · ν2/δ > δ2 ⇐⇒ ρδp > ν2/δ
(169)
Under condition (167) and from the fact δ ≥ ν, we get
δρδp > δ
2 ≥ ν2 =⇒ ρδp > ν2/δ (170)
which ensures f(t) > δ2 > 0 for any t. For the third condition
(163), we first note that we need the left-hand side of (163)
to be positive, which requires
ρ2δ2pν
′′ − tρδpδ2 > 0 ⇐⇒ ρδpν′ + t(ρ2δ2p − δ2) > 0
(171)
where we used ν′′ = ν′ + tρδp. By (167) and (161) we know
that (171) holds. Then, we have
ρ2δ2pν
′′ − tρδpδ2 > µmaxρ2δ2pδ2
⇐⇒ ρδpν′ + t(ρ2δ2p − δ2) > µmaxρδpδ2
⇐⇒ µmax <
(
ν′ +
t(ρ2δ2p − δ2)
ρδp
)
/δ2 (172)
Therefore, we arrive at the following sufficient conditions for
the convergence of (85)–(87):
0 < µmax < µo, t <
ν
δ + ρδp
, ρ >
δ
δp
(173)
where
µo , min
 2ν′δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp , ν
′ +
t(ρ2δ2p−δ2)
ρδp
δ2
 (174)
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Subtracting (96)–(98) from (93)–(95) we get
φ˜∞i = w˜
∞
i−1 − c1ρU [∇wTp(w∞)−∇wTp(wi−1)] (175)
ψ˜∞i = φ˜
∞
i − U [F (φ∞)− F (φi)] + Usi(φi) (176)
w˜∞i = ψ˜
∞
i − c2ρU [∇wTp(ψ∞)−∇wTp(ψi)] (177)
where φ˜∞i , φ∞−φi, ψ˜∞i , ψ∞−ψi, and w˜∞i , w∞−wi.
From (175) we have
E‖φ˜∞i ‖2
≤ E‖w˜∞i−1‖2 + c21µ2maxρ2E‖∇wTp(w∞)−∇wTp(wi−1)‖2
− 2c1ρE
[
w˜∞Ti−1U [∇wTp(w∞)−∇wTp(wi−1)]
]
≤ (1 + 2c1tµmaxρδp + c1µ2maxρ2δ2p)E‖w˜∞i−1‖2 (178)
and, similarly, from (177) we obtain
E‖w˜∞i ‖2 ≤ (1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ2maxρ2δ2p)E‖ψ˜∞i ‖2
(179)
Similar to (147), we can rewrite assumption (76) as
E
[‖si(wi−1)‖2|F i−1] ≤ 2α‖w˜∞i−1‖2 + β′′ (180)
for β′′ , β + 2α‖w∞‖2. Then, from (176) we obtain:
E‖ψ˜∞i ‖2 ≤ E‖φ˜∞i ‖2 + µ2maxE‖F (φ∞)− F (φi)‖2
+ µ2maxE‖s(φi)‖2 − 2E
[
φ˜∞Ti U [F (φ
∞)− F (φi)]
]
≤ (1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2max(δ2 + 2α))E‖φ˜∞i ‖2 + µ2maxβ′′
(181)
Therefore, we can combine (178)–(181) to get
E‖w˜∞i ‖2
≤ (1 + 2c1tµmaxρδp + c1µ2maxρ2δ2p)
× (1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ2maxρ2δ2p)
× (1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2max(δ2 + 2α))E‖w˜∞i−1‖2
+ µ2max(1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ
2
maxρ
2δ2p)β
′′
= (1 + 2tµmaxρδp + µ
2
maxρ
2δ2p)
(
1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2max(δ2 + 2α)
)
× E‖w˜∞i−1‖2 + µ2max(1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ2maxρ2δ2p)β′′
(182)
We expand the product of the two terms as
(1 + 2tµmaxρδp + µ
2
maxρ
2δ2p)(1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2max(δ2 + 2α))
, 1− a2 (183)
where
a2 , 2µmaxν′ − µ2max(δ2 + 2α+ ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp)
+ µ3max(ρ
2δ2pν
′′ − tρδp(δ2 + 2α))− µ4maxρ2δ2p(δ2 + 2α)
(184)
Then, the mean-square error E‖w˜∞i ‖2 converges asymptoti-
cally as i→∞ if we have |1−a2| < 1, which requires a2 > 0
since from (158) we know 1 − a2 ≥ 0. Following a similar
argument to the one presented in Appendix E, we obtain that
the following conditions ensure the convergence of E‖w˜∞i ‖2:
ν′ > 0 (185)
δ2 + 2α+ ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp > 0 (186)
µ3max(ρ
2δ2pν
′′ − tρδp(δ2 + 2α)) > µ4maxρ2δ2p(δ2 + 2α) (187)
2µmaxν
′ − µ2max(δ2 + 2α+ ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp) > 0 (188)
The first two yield the same results in (166) and (167), i.e.,
t <
ν
δ + ρδp
, ρ >
δ
δp
(189)
For the third condition we need to ensure
ρ2δ2pν
′′ − tρδp(δ2 + 2α) > 0
⇐⇒ ρδpν′ + t(ρ2δ2p − (δ2 + 2α)) > 0 (190)
A stricter condition on ρ is therefore required:
ρ >
√
δ2 + 2α
δp
(191)
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We then get
ρδpν
′′ − t(δ2 + 2α) > µmaxρδp(δ2 + 2α)
⇐⇒ µmax <
ν′ +
t(ρ2δ2p−(δ2+2α))
ρδp
δ2 + 2α
(192)
Combining the last condition (188), we get the step-size
condition as
0 < µmax < µ
′
o (193)
where
µ′o , min
{
2ν′
δ2 + 2α+ ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp
,
ν′ +
t(ρ2δ2p−(δ2+2α))
ρδp
δ2 + 2α
}
(194)
Therefore, under conditions (189), (191), and (193), the re-
cursion (182) is stable and the resulting mean-square error is
upper bounded by
lim
i→∞
supE‖w˜∞i ‖2 ≤
µ2max(1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ
2
maxρ
2δ2p)β
′′
a2
=
µmax(1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ
2
maxρ
2δ2p)β
′′
2ν′ −O(µmax)
= O(µmax) (195)
for sufficiently small step-sizes.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We recall from (33) that the Nash equilibrium w? satisfies
the relation:
w? = w? − U [F (w?) + ρ∇wTp(w?)]
= w? − UF (w?)− c1ρU∇wTp(w?)− c2ρU∇wTp(w?)
= φ? − UF (w?)− c2ρU∇wTp(w?)
= ψ? − c2ρU∇wTp(w?) (196)
where we introduced two auxiliary variables φ? and ψ?:
φ? = w? − c1ρU∇wTp(w?) (197)
ψ? = φ? − UF (w?) (198)
If we further introduce the error vectors φ˜ , φ? − φ∞, ψ˜ ,
ψ?−ψ∞, and w˜ , w?−w∞, then using (196)–(198) we have
φ˜ = w˜ − c1ρU [∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(w∞)] (199)
ψ˜ = φ˜− U [F (w?)− F (φ∞)] (200)
w˜ = ψ˜ − c2ρU [∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(ψ∞)] (201)
From (199), the squared norm of φ˜ satisfies
‖φ˜‖2 ≤ ‖w˜‖2 − 2c1ρw˜TU [∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(w∞)]
+ c1µ
2
maxρ
2‖∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(w∞)‖2
≤ Y1‖w˜‖2 (202)
where we used (140) and (70) and introduced
Y1 , 1 + 2c1tµmaxρδp + c1µ2maxρ2δ2p (203)
From (200), the squared norm of ψ˜ satisfies
‖ψ˜‖2 = ‖φ˜‖2 − 2φ˜TU [F (w?)− F (φ∞)]
+ ‖U [F (w?)− F (φ∞)]‖2 (204)
We note that
−2φ˜TU [F (w?)− F (φ∞)]
= −2φ˜TU [F (φ?)− F (φ∞)]− 2φ˜TU [F (w?)− F (φ?)]
(a)
≤ −2µmaxν′′‖φ˜‖2 + 2µmax‖F (w?)− F (φ?)‖ · ‖φ˜‖
(b)
≤ −2µmaxν′′‖φ˜‖2 + 2c1µ2maxδ‖F (w?)‖ · ‖φ˜‖ (205)
where step (a) is from (69) and Ho¨lder’s inequality and step
(b) is due to
‖F (w?)− F (φ?)‖ ≤ δ‖w? − φ?‖ ≤ c1µmaxδ‖F (w?)‖
(206)
since from (197) and (33) we have
‖w? − φ?‖ = ‖c1ρU∇wTp(w?)‖ ≤ c1µmax‖F (w?)‖ (207)
We further note that
‖U [F (w?)− F (φ∞)]‖2 ≤ µ2maxδ2‖w? − φ∞‖2
≤ µ2maxδ2‖φ˜‖2 + 2c1µ3maxδ2‖F (w?)‖ · ‖φ˜‖
+ c1µ
4
maxδ
2‖F (w?)‖2 (208)
where we used the fact w? − φ∞ = φ? − φ∞ +w? − φ? and
‖w? − φ∞‖2
= ‖φ˜‖2 + 2φ˜T(w? − φ?) + ‖w? − φ?‖2
≤ ‖φ˜‖2 + 2‖w? − φ?‖ · ‖φ˜‖+ c1µ2max‖F (w?)‖2
≤ ‖φ˜‖2 + 2c1µmax‖F (w?)‖ · ‖φ˜‖+ c1µ2max‖F (w?)‖2
(209)
Using (205) and (208) we get
‖ψ˜‖2 ≤ X‖φ˜‖2 + 2c1µ2max(1 + µmaxδ)δ‖F (w?)‖ · ‖φ˜‖
+ c1µ
4
maxδ
2‖F (w?)‖2 (210)
where we introduced
X , 1− 2µmaxν′′ + µ2maxδ2 ≥ 0 (211)
Note that X is always nonnegative by (158). Similarly, from
(201) we have
‖w˜‖2 ≤ ‖ψ˜‖2 + c2µ2maxρ2‖∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(ψ∞)‖2
− 2c2ρψ˜TU [∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(ψ∞)]
≤ ‖ψ˜‖2 + c2µ2maxρ2δ2p‖w? − ψ∞‖2
− 2c2ρψ˜TU [∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(ψ?)]
+ 2c2tµmaxρδp‖ψ˜‖2 (212)
where we rewrote
∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(w∞)
= ∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(ψ?) +∇wTp(ψ?)−∇wTp(w∞)
(213)
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and used (140) and (70). By (196) we know that
‖w? − ψ?‖ = ‖c2ρU∇wTp(w?)‖
≤ c2µmax‖ρ∇wTp(w?)‖
= c2µmax‖F (w?)‖ (214)
Then, it follows that
‖w? − ψ∞‖2
= ‖ψ˜‖2 + 2ψ˜T(w? − ψ?) + ‖w? − ψ?‖2
≤ ‖ψ˜‖2 + 2‖w? − ψ?‖ · ‖ψ˜‖+ c2µ2max‖F (w?)‖2
≤ ‖ψ˜‖2 + 2c2µmax‖F (w?)‖ · ‖ψ˜‖+ c2µ2max‖F (w?)‖2
(215)
Furthermore, we can use the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and
the Lipschitz-continuous assumption again to write
−2c2ρψ˜TU [∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(ψ?)]
≤ 2c2ρµmax‖∇wTp(w?)−∇wTp(ψ?)‖ · ‖ψ˜‖
≤ 2c2µmaxρδp‖w? − ψ?‖ · ‖ψ˜‖
≤ 2c2µ2maxρδp‖F (w?)‖ · ‖ψ˜‖ (216)
where the last inequality is by (214). Substituting (215) and
(216) into (212), we get
‖w˜‖2 ≤ Y2‖ψ˜‖2 + 2c2µ2max(1 + µmaxρδp)ρδp‖F (w?)‖ · ‖ψ˜‖
+ c2µ
4
maxρ
2δ2p‖F (w?)‖2 (217)
where we introduced
Y2 , 1 + 2c2tµmaxρδp + c2µ2maxρ2δ2p (218)
To continue, we note the following properties:
Y1Y2 = 1 + 2tµmaxρδp + µ2maxρ2δ2p , Y (219)
c1Y2 = c1, c2Y1 = c2Y (220)
c1Y1 = c1Y, c2Y2 = c2Y (221)
c2‖ψ˜‖2 = c2X‖w˜‖2 ⇐⇒ c2‖ψ˜‖ = c2
√
X‖w˜‖ (222)
by recalling c1 · c2 = 1 and c1 + c2 = 1 in (88). Combining
(202), (210) and (217) we obtain
‖w˜‖2 ≤ Y1Y2X‖w˜‖2
+ 2c1µ
2
max(1 + µmaxδ)δ‖F (w?)‖
√
Y1 · ‖w˜‖
+ 2c2µ
2
max(1 + µmaxρδp)ρδp‖F (w?)‖
√
Y2 · ‖w˜‖
+ c1µ
4
maxδ
2‖F (w?)‖2 + c2µ4maxρ2δ2p‖F (w?)‖2
= YX‖w˜‖2 + 2µ2max‖F (w?)‖
√YZ · ‖w˜‖
+ µ4max(c1δ
2 + c2ρ
2δ2p) · ‖F (w?)‖2 (223)
where
Z , c1(1 + µmaxδ)δ + c2(1 + µmaxρδp)ρδp (224)
Noting 1−YX = a1 as defined in (160), we can rewrite (223)
as
a1‖w˜‖2 − 2b‖w˜‖ ≤ η (225)
where
b , 2µ2max‖F (w?)‖
√YZ ≥ 0 (226)
η , µ4max(c1δ2 + c2ρ2δ2p) · ‖F (w?)‖2 ≥ 0 (227)
From Appendix E, we know that a1 > 0 if
0 < µmax < µo, t <
ν
δ + ρδp
, ρ >
δ
δp
(228)
Under these conditions we can rewrite (225) as(
‖w˜‖ − b
a1
)2
≤ η
a1
+
b2
a21
⇐⇒ b
a1
−
√
η
a1
+
b2
a21
≤ ‖w˜‖ ≤ b
a1
+
√
η
a1
+
b2
a21
(229)
Noting that
b
a1
−
√
η
a1
+
b2
a21
=
b
a1
−
√
b2 + a1η
a1
≤ 0 (230)
we get
0 ≤ ‖w˜‖ ≤ b
a1
+
√
η
a1
+
b2
a21
(231)
Our goal is to study the bias performance for sufficiently small
step-sizes, which can be examined from
lim
µmax→0
sup
‖w˜‖
µmax
≤ lim
µmax→0
b
a1µmax
+ lim
µmax→0
√
η
a1µ2max
+
b2
a21µ
2
max
(232)
From (226) and (160) we have
lim
µmax→0
b
a1µmax
= lim
µmax→0
2‖F (w?)‖√YZ
2ν′ − µmax(δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp) +O(µ2max)
= d1(c1δ + c2ρδp) (233)
where we used the fact lim
µmax→0
Y = 1 and introduced
d1 , ‖F (w?)‖/ν′ (234)
From the definition (227) we get
lim
µmax→0
η
a1µ2max
= lim
µmax→0
µmax(c1δ
2 + c2ρ
2δ2p) · ‖F (w?)‖2
2ν′ − µmax(δ2 + ρ2δ2p − 4tν′′ρδp) +O(µ2max)
= 0 (235)
Consequently, we have
lim
µmax→0
sup
‖w˜‖
µmax
≤ 2d1(c1δ + c2ρδp) < 2d1ρδp (236)
where we used the condition ρ > δ/δp and the fact c1+c2 = 1.
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